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The role of international criminal prosecutions in increasing compliance with 
international humanitarian law in contemporary African conflicts 
Robert Cryer

 
1. Introduction 
In the recent past two decades, international criminal law has been tasked with many (indeed, 
too may) roles. In addition to retributivist aims, it has been asked to satisfy victims’ demands 
for catharsis, write history, and perhaps most prominently, deter international crimes.
1
 It is 
questionable whether it can fulfill them all.
 2
 For example, many international criminal 
lawyers are dubious of the ability of courts to write history.
3
 Happily, the ability of 
international criminal law to fulfil many of these goals need not concern us for the purpose of 
this chapter. Here we are looking at two of the most relevant justifications given for 
international criminal processes for the question of the extent to which prosecutions can assist 
in increasing compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This piece will 
concentrate therefore on deterrence, and denunciation/education. These two are linked, but 
not uncontroversial.  
Prior to that, however, certain limitations of international criminal law in relation to ensuring 
compliance with IHL have to be identified. The most important of these is that only one of 
the four ‘core’ international crimes (aggression, genocide, crimes against and war crimes) has 
a direct relationship with IHL. That is the law of war crimes. Although the term is often used 
in a loose sense to mean international crimes more generally, war crimes stricto sensu are a 
criminalized sub set of violations of IHL.
4
 Therefore some of the norms contained in the law 
of war crimes are in fact somewhat narrower than those of humanitarian law,
5
 and indeed 
some IHL norms are not appropriate for criminalization, and therefore the two are not 
identical.
6
 Therefore prosecutions for war crimes can never be considered a means of 
ensuring compliance with all of IHL for the simple reason that such prosecutions cannot be 
for the full panoply of IHL rights and responsibilities.  
Secondly, speaking specifically to the African context, Africa is (although it may be trite to 
say it) a large and diverse continent. Darfur province in Sudan alone, for example, is the size 
of France. North Africa, in particular the Arabic States (Libya, Egypt) are culturally, 
politically, and economically far removed from many sub-Saharan States. East and West 
Africa are not, in and of themselves readily analogisable. Indeed even States that are 
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reasonably close together, such as Uganda and Sudan are very different places, and the 
reaction to international criminal law and its institutions are not the same.
7
 Furthermore, the 
political systems in different African States include military dictatorships (Egypt), 
democracies (South Africa), authoritarian regimes (Rwanda, Zimbabwe), all of which have 
different levels of stability. Libya, for example is deeply unstable, Rwanda, on the other hand 
is stable. Leading on from this, it is also the case that some countries are practically 
ungoverned by their central authorities (parts of the DRC spring to mind), whilst others are 
fully governed spaces.
8
 Hence it is important when speaking of Africa not to speak in an 
omnibus fashion that ignores these significant differences, therefore this contribution will at 
least attempt to contextualize its remarks. 
Finally, as Olivier Bangerter has said elsewhere in this volume ‘better respect for 
international humanitarian law is primarily the result of inside action and no one can respect 
international humanitarian law in the stead of  parties to a conflict. Outsiders such as political 
actors, humanitarian players, non-governmental organizations, the media or academics can 
only have an indirect effect on respect for international humanitarian law’.9 This is also the 
case for international criminal law, and it ought to be remembered other mechanisms are also 
available to increase respect for IHL. The role of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross is one that immediately springs to mind.
10
 These initial caveats noted, it is time to 
discuss the possibilities of prosecution in this regard. 
 
2. Deterrence in international criminal law 
 
Deterrence is one of the most well-known aims of the criminal law, indeed Gerhard Werle 
considers it to be probably the most important of the aims of international criminal justice, 
certainly more so than retribution.
11
 Deterrence is usually said to have two parts, special and 
general deterrence. The former is individually focused, in that specific offender is intended to 
be dissuaded from undertaking the prohibited behavior owing to their fear of being subject to 
the relevant punishment. As Dierde Golash has put it ‘[t]he threat of deterrent punishment 
seeks to operate on the will of the individual offender at the moment of temptation to commit 
the crime’.12 We will return to this issue presently. 
General prevention, on the other hand, addresses the punishment of the individual offender to 
society more generally, in that the punishment of the individual is pour l’example des autres. 
I.e. that having seen that engaging in that conduct leads to punishment, they will come to the 
conclusion that they ought not engage in that conduct either, for fear of the same treatment, 
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or a more general sense that the law ought to be followed as that is the appropriate thing to 
do
13
 (or in Razian terms, create an idea that the rules themselves are second order reasons for 
action).
14
 The latter is the more attractive idea from the point of view of a liberal criminal 
justice system, in that the former raises the rather uncomfortable spectre of the treatment of 
the body of the condemned and the spectacle of the scaffold described by Michel Foucault in 
Discipline and Punish.
15
  
It is likely for this reason that the ICTY has empahsised the rule of law rationale: 
During times of armed conflict, all persons must now be more aware of the 
obligations upon them in relation to fellow combatants and protected persons, 
particularly civilians. Thus, it is hoped that the Tribunal and other international courts 
are bringing about the development of a culture of respect for the rule of law and not 
simply the fear of the consequences of breaking the law, and thereby deterring the 
commission of crimes.
16
 
Retributivists, on the other hand do not think that this is ever acceptable, as it treats the 
punished person as a means to an end. This is particularly offensive to Kantians.
17
 The 
ICTY’s response, that deterrence, as a result, ought not to be given undue prominence in a 
sentence,
18
 is not a complete response to such claims, as any additional sentence on this 
ground is unwarranted to retributivists. 
These critiques aside, foundational documents of international criminal law enshrine 
deterrence, so for example the Genocide Convention is, in its full title, the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide clearly links the role of prosecution 
and prevention. The same can be said about the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture.
19
  
Security Council Resolution 827, which set up the ICTY (and which Resolution 955 which 
set up the ICTR repeated, essentially verbatim) spoke clearly of the role of deterrence, saying 
that it was: 
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to 
justice the persons who are responsible for them,…Convinced that in the particular 
circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the establishment as an ad hoc measure by 
the Council of an international tribunal and the prosecution of persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law would enable this aim to be 
achieved and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace,…[and]…Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal and the 
prosecution of persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of international 
humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and 
effectively redressed.
20
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The Rome Statute also foregrounds general and specific deterrence.
21
 For example, paragraph 
5 of the preamble states that the parties are ‘[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes’. 
Chambers  of the ICC have also relied on deterrence to reach various (not always consistent) 
conclusions about what where the ICC should concentrate its energies.
22
 Indeed, the Appeals 
Chamber went as far as to determine that deterrence is the ‘cornerstone’ of the ICC.23 This 
goes too far, the ICC is set various goals by the Rome Statute, some deontological, some 
utilitarian, and the Statue does not set a hierarchy between them.
24
 That said, there is no 
doubt that, rightly or wrongly, deterrence is an important goal that the drafters of the Rome 
Statute set for the ICC. 
 
2.1 Critiques of Deterrence 
 
In addition to the philosophical difficulties mentioned above, there have been more practical 
critiques of the reliance of many international criminal lawyers on deterrence-based 
rationales. The two main ones are that deterrence –based rationales do not reflect the 
conditions under which international crimes are committed. The second, which is linked to a 
response to the first, is that the empirical basis for any deterrent function is missing, or 
indeed, points to a contrary conclusion.  
 
2.1.1. Deterrence, rationality and international crimes/criminals 
Turning first to the idea of rationality which, as mentioned above, is key to individual 
deterrence, one of the most sophisticated commentators on deterrence in international 
criminal law, Mark Drumbl, has expressed the difficulty as follows: ‘because deterrence’s 
assumption of a certain degree of perpetrator rationality, which is grounded in liberalism’s 
treatment of the ordinary common criminal, seems particularly ill fitting for those who 
perpetrate atrocity.’25  
It is true that there is little rationality to be expected of drugged child soldiers, for example, 
however, what needs to be remembered is that although war crimes will, sadly, almost 
inevitably be committed in armed conflicts, for the most part, they can be limited though 
proper command, which international criminal law not only encourages, but punishes certain 
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failures to exercise.
26
 In this respect, it is important to note that although its norms are 
applicable to all, international criminal law, in particular international criminal prosecutions, 
tend to focus on those in leadership positions, and leaders tend to operate in a more 
autonomous fashion.
27
 One of the reasons international criminal law has doctrines such as 
command responsibility, joint criminal enterprise and co-perpetration, is to ensure that those 
who lead, direct, or permit such offences are responsible for them.
28
 Leaders, in contrast to 
some of those in the lower ranks, are more likely to be rational actors, with a view to longer-
term consequences. As von Holderstein Holtermann has said: 
Political and military leaders are generally placed in circumstances where their 
contribution plays a decisive role as events unfold. Even though they surely cannot 
perform mass atrocities single-handedly, their actions as leaders are undoubtedly 
necessary in order for them to take place.…and there are several good reasons to 
suppose that, in contrast to foot soldiers, these leaders can, in the right circumstances, 
be deterred by the threat of punishment, i.e. that they are instrumentally rational in the 
sense desired.
29
 
There are those, however, who disagree about political leaders, Jan Klabbers, for example has 
argued that we cannot apply the cost-benefit analysis that is assumed to be made by 
deterrence, based rationales simply does not apply to human rights violators  who ‘will act 
for political reasons, hoping, nay, expecting, that history will prove him or her right.’30 This 
may apply to the ends sought, but that does not exclude the possibility of affecting the means 
adopted to those ends. 
Others argue that, particularly in the context of ‘new wars’ featuring ‘militias, paramilitaries, 
gangs and loosely organized rebel groups instead of organized militias as the main actors, 
[and] economic motivations and mindless ethnic hatred had replaced national interests or 
ideological visions as the driving forces of these conflicts’.31 This means, according to the 
proponents of such a view, that the rational calculation that forms the basis theories of 
deterrence is missing in such contexts.
32
 Others add that, with respect to non-State armed 
groups in particular, the absence of reciprocity (in the sense of belligerent privilege),
33
 and a 
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sense of ownership of IHL
34
 provide further disincentives to comply, which further 
undermines any calculations such groups may make. 
There are a number of responses that can be given to some such claims.
35
 To begin, there is 
an empirical response, as Sandesh Sivakumaran has shown, in fact rebel groups are not 
always as disorganized as they are often portrayed, and they frequently do have codes of 
conduct.
36
 The image of armed groups as entirely unorganized is one that it not entirely borne 
out in practice. The second is to question about what these suggestions implicitly consider to 
be different about African conflicts and their protagonists. Nicholas Lamp asserts that in the 
context of mass international crimes, such as former Yugoslavia and Rwanda crimes moral 
inversions may occur, that lead to international crimes.
37
 Similarly Golash, looking at the 
sociological factors surrounding international crimes avers that  
Mass atrocities often occur under a reign of terror by a despotic government or 
ruthless factions such as the LRA….Those who voluntarily participate in these crimes 
find themselves in situations in which the social pressure not to harm (some) others 
has suddenly been removed or, indeed, has been turned into its opposite pressure from 
either peers or authorities to target despised others..[hence]..It is not realistic to think 
that the threat of punishment by an international body can counter the psychological, 
situational and social pressures that induce individuals to engage in atrocities.
38
 
It is important in these situations, though to take into account that in Africa, as in other 
conflicts, these moral inversions are not the outcome of immediate irrationality, but the 
culmination of processes of rational, albeit deeply unpleasant calculations on the part of 
leaders.
39
 As Susan Power, drawing upon the empirical research of Alison des Forges has 
argued, ‘people who play a role in mass killings and rapes are often doing so for the first 
time…individuals who have never killed before are deciding how far to go. Often as they 
make these decisions, they are looking left, and looking right, and gauging the 
consequences’.40 
In the context of Africa, in particular, the frequent invocation of this new war paradigm often 
has a ring of very old fashioned, colonial views of Africa and Africans as irrational, with all 
that entails. To take one example,
41
 Errol Mendes, a scholar who has undertaken work in the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, has taken a view that the ICC should have no truck with 
the Lord’s Resistance Army, on the basis that  
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38
 Golsan, ‘Justification’ above note 12, at 211-212, 215. 
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American Journal of International Law.7 at 7. 
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41
 It ought to be said that neither Drumbl or Wipmann could be accused of making such simplistic assumptions. 
Kony…claims that he is instructed in spiritual and military matters by holy spirits and 
is tasked with fighting evil by promoting the Ten Commandments of the Old 
Testament. He obviously has not learned that those Commandments include children 
honouring their parents and not committing murder. This mental incongruence must 
be kept in mind when one thinks about whether someone with the mental and 
psychological makeup of Kony can ever be a reliable peace partner to even begin to 
start a discussion on peace and justice.
42
   
The question of whether or not the ICC should take anything said by Joseph Kony as reliable 
is a fair one, but the manner in which it is parlayed by Mendes, as one of mental capacity is 
unhelpful. Often, even groups stigmatized as fanatical and driven by religious zeal rather than 
sober reflection act on rational grounds. The most prominent example of this is the Lord´s 
Resistance Army in Uganda. The LRA is often described in terms of religious fervor, 
however, when it came to issues of international criminal justice, is demands, for amnesty, 
and for the withdrawal of indictments, were clearly the outcome of rational calculation. 
Indeed, as was the decision to engage in peace negotiations after the indictments came. His 
actions, as with those of the Lord’s Resistance Army, awful though they may be, ought not to 
simply be cast aside as pathological. The decisions of the senior members of the LRA may 
be, although deeply immoral, rational when the context is taken into account, as has been 
shown by Reed Wood in his contribution to this volume (although his view is that short 
interests prevail with such groups, the point here is that the group makes rational 
calculations).
43
 
This is not the only example. In relation to Sierra Leone, Foday Sankoh wanted money, 
Charles Taylor wanted money and power, and Colonel Gadaffi wanted a West-African 
fiefdom. These are not the aims of the blindly irrational or nihilistic. They may not be 
laudable goals, but they are understandable ones, and they went about them in a manner 
which at one level, was rational. Finally, the African Union reaction to various aspects of the 
ICC´s practice in indicting people, that they will fight to the end rather than face prosecution, 
is a clear example of the acceptance of the rationality of the behavior of the various actors, 
and therefore the critics of the possibility of application of deterrence, on the basis that the 
protagonists are not rational, seems to be at least overstated. High-ranking leaders are rarely 
completely irrational.
44
 Nor are they stupid. That sort of leader does not last long. 
To take matters further on this, it is the case that even within the international criminal 
tribunals an image of the African Warlord who is the definitional ‘Other’, has been 
constructed. It is possible that the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and perhaps other 
international (or internationalized) Tribunals have fallen victim to this simplistic stereotype. 
For example, Gerhard Anders has shown that in that Court, the prosecution has frequently 
fallen into a narrative of Africa as being the ‘dark continent’ of 19th Century myth.45 
Similarly M. Kamari Clarke has argued that representations of defendants before the 
international tribunals involve constructions of ‘African warlords’ that are Western constructs 
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rather than accurate representations of reality, and that such representations (in her terms 
‘spectacles’) are examples of crass stereotypes that undermine to some extent international 
criminal law, and fail to accurately reflect modern Africa.
46
  
Such stereotypes ought to not to be used by those discussing international criminal law. 
Indeed, to be fair, two of the most forthright critics of the deterrence rationale in international 
criminal law, Julian Ku and Jide Nzilibe has made arguments in the specific context of 
African conflicts, precisely on the basis of rational calculation of the actors involved. Their 
argument is that the threat of ICC prosecution will not deter those who are engaged in 
possible international crimes to the extent to which informal or extra-legal sanctions will.
47
 In 
part this is because, of the African leaders of coups that they evaluated, many were killed, 
exiled, or arrested.  
The argument is flawed for various reasons. The first is that although it is purportedly 
empirical, as with much law and economic scholarship, it relies on assumed interests rather 
than proof of them.
48
 In their piece the authors presume what the interests, motivations and 
intentions of the coupists were, there is no hint that any of the relevant actors were actually 
asked about what their motivations were. Second, as others have commented, their 
assumption is that evidence about coup plotters are probative of those who commit 
international crimes more generally, and the commission of atrocities are a necessary part of 
African conflicts, neither of which can be taken for granted.
49
 Nonetheless Ku and Nzilibe do 
at least seem to accept is that there is rationality to the decisions made by such actors, a 
matter all too often overlooked by others. It is not the intention of this chapter to say that 
every decision in every conflict in Africa is characterized by rationality, any more than it is in 
any area of the world. But what can be seen is that the groups engaged in such activities (or at 
least their leadership) often do so on the basis of rational calculations. And where rational 
calculations are entered into there is at least room for the possibility for the fear of 
prosecution (hence deterrence) to enter the balance. 
Lastly in this regard, in a detailed study of the actions of the governments of Uganda and 
Sudan with respect to the ICC and complementarity (on which, more later), Sarah Nouwen 
has found that those governments have engaged in a detailed a cost-benefit analysis that 
interestingly comports with the rational decision making capacity of governments, even those 
that are alleged to have committed international crimes (particularly in the case of Sudan).
50
 
Henceforth the argument of an absence of rationality, this critique is not convincing, or at 
least not universally valid. 
 
2.1.2. The empirical base 
This leads us to the empirical response to the critics of deterrence. Scholars and practitioners 
have frequently that there has been a deterrent effect that can be traced back to the existence 
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of international criminal tribunals. So, for example, a number of scholars have asserted that 
the deterrent function of international criminal trials has been key to their importance.
51
  It is , 
nonetheless, a frequently made criticism of deterrence-based justifications of punishment that 
empirically, it is very difficult, both at the domestic, but particularly at the international level, 
to show that the threat of punishment has a deterrent effect. As Immi Tallgren put it: ‘It is not 
easy to estimate how likely the preventive effect of the international system is. There are no 
grounds to exclude the possibility of such an effect. Neither is there evidence in its favor.’52 
Even though, as Samantha Power has said, showing deterrence involves proving a negative, 
and is therefore difficult, or perhaps impossible, to do
53
 that has not stopped critics of the 
deterrence rationale from adopting an empirical critique of deterrence in international 
criminal law.  
In the past, the absence of enforcement of international criminal law, and the small number of 
offenders that international criminal tribunals have prosecuted, has been said, with no little 
justification, to have undermined the goal of deterrence, as people do not think that they are 
likely to be punished.
54
 Indeed, even where there have been such tribunals, some have 
questioned whether there was any deterrent effect that is attributable their existence. This 
critique has specifically been made with respect to the ICTY, in particular when the existence 
of that tribunal did not serve to prevent the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. This was, in the 
eyes of the heart and soul of the ICTY at the time, Antonio Cassese, amongst the darkest days 
in the Tribunal’s history.55 On the other hand, as David Wippman notes there is some 
anecdotal evidence that there was some level of deterrence in that conflict that can be placed 
at the door of the ICTY.
56
 Beyond this, as Power has explained, in spite of the difficulties, 
many critics may be looking in the wrong places for evidence: 
You cannot look for deterrence from institutions that only gained enforcement 
capacity after the atrocities had been carried out. If you were going to measure the 
impact of the Hague Tribunal-if social scientists were to figure out a formula for 
measuring prevention and deterrence-the place to apply that formula would not be 
Bosnia, not Kosovo.
57
 
Such arguments are echoed, and amplified by James Alexander, who, adding the 
multifactorial nature of decision making in conflict situations, has said 
Can policy makers, deliberating upon their countries’ relationship with the ICC come 
to firm conclusions serve as about whether the ICC may be expected to serve as a net 
benefit or a net liability to the cause of preventing humanitarian atrocities? The short 
answer is no…the simple reality [is] that a rather large assortment of variables must 
be dealt with. Some of these variables, based as they are on historically novel 
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characteristics of the ICC, are at present truly imponderable, having the potential to 
swamp the effects of the other variables in play.
58
 
There has also been some more systematic work in this area now. In particular, Kathryn 
Sikkink has undertaken a large empirical study, based on trials around the world, and 
statistical analysis of human rights practices in countries that had what she describes as 
“human rights “trials (and those did not) and the level of repression seen in later years there. 
On the basis of that study, she asserts that there is a deterrent function that accompanies 
criminal prosecutions of international crimes that can be statistically shown.
59
 
Furthermore, recent anecdotal evidence from members of the UN Office of Political Affairs 
from on the ground is very much that the words ‘the Hague’ have a considerable chilling 
effect on actors in Africa, particularly, given the focus of the ICC, to which we will return, on 
rebels, but now also on government officials.
60
 Furthermore, the reaction of many African 
leaders to the indictment of Omar al-Bashir and Muammar Gadaffi, which has been to call 
for the suspension of such indictments in the interests of international peace and security 
certainly implies that the threat of prosecution is now being taken very seriously.
61
 Leaders 
do not generally waste their time and political capital fulminating against trifling matters.  
Similarly, Fatou Bensouda, the (then) deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, has asserted that the 
ICC’s activities have had ‘an impact’ in various countries in Africa.62  
Probably the most detailed evaluation of the ICC’s practice in this regard has come from Juan 
Méndez, who was the Secretary-General’s Special adviser to the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention of Genocide, and remains one of the leading advocates for prosecutions as a 
means of prevention/deterrence. His first examples are the DRC, the Central African 
Republic, Kenya, Northern Uganda, and Sudan. In all of these instances Mendez asserts that 
threats of ICC action led to the exclusion of amnesties at the domestic level, and that ‘since 
the ICC became operational, conflict managers have learned that impunity and blanket 
amnesties are no longer in their toolkit’.63  
This is interesting, and may be true (although the alleged offer made to Colonel Gadaffi to 
leave and go into exile may speak against this) but, it has to be said, most of the examples do 
not prove the point that any deterrent effect can be placed at the door of the ICC. It may be, 
in the long run, that the continued deligitimation of amnesties and (which perhaps is not the 
same thing) ending impunity leads to deterrence, but that is a thin thread to hold up 
international criminal justice. A more positive spin may be put on aspects of this, that it does 
not seem that ICC activity had a negative effect on peace negotiations,
64
  but that is not really 
the concern of this piece.  
One exception to the questionable relevance of these examples may be Kenya, here 
considerable international engagement in relation to investigation and prosecution of those 
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responsible for post-election violence in 2007 led the President and Prime Minister to 
commit, in 2009, to prevent violence in the next election cycle.
65
 The 2013 was, by some 
distance, the most peaceful in Kenyan history, although ICC oversight is probably only one 
factor here (although that itself is a significant development). 
Looking to circumstances in which the ICC has not actually taken (judicial) action, Méndez 
may be similarly speaking to the wrong point when he notes that ICC’s oversight in the 
situation in Columbia arguably influenced the Columbian Constitutional Court in overturning 
an amnesty law,
66
 and that in Guinea calls for accountability in relation to crimes committed 
in Conkary in 2009 led the government to cooperate with the Court and invite it to visit 
there.
67
 Both may be heartening, but neither of these instances speak directly to deterrence 
per se. Equally, at least in one situation, Méndez is probably on stronger ground. In relation 
to the Côte d’Ivoirean conflict in 2004, Méndez refers to a hugely tense situation, when over 
a weekend flashpoint, the media was filled with hate speech. Following his public 
intervention noting the possibility of ICC investigations, calm returned. Méndez claims that 
‘the prospect of an ICC prosecution of those wo used hate speech to instigate and incite the 
commission of international crimes was carefully analysed by persons in authority and their 
legal advisors….the incident is [thus] sufficient anecdotal evidence that the threat of 
prosecution in some cases can stay the hand of the perpetrators of mass atrocities’.68 
This is important, but, in addition to the fact that the other evidence he brings is far from 
perfect, there are two other aspects that need to be dealt with before we can accept such 
assertions at face value. The first of these is that, as Méndez makes clear, his second set of 
pieces of evidence are related to the assumed catalytic effect of the regime of 
complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statute of the ICC.
69
 The general assumption 
underlying that principle is that, given the idea that complementarity, which allows the ICC 
to take action if the relevant State (usually the locus delicti) is shown to be unwilling or 
unable to do so, this will prompt such States into taking action leading to prosecutions 
themselves.
70
  
However, such an assumption has recently been the subject of a significant empirical critique 
from Sarah Nouwen.
71
 Nouwen questions the unproved causal pathway between the 
(implicit) assumptions behind the assertions that complementarity will cause domestic action 
(prosecutions) which should then pay into deterrence.
72
 On the basis of detailed studies of 
Uganda and Sudan, Nouwen has found that ‘[n]otably, the one and only effect that is directly 
relevant for an invocation of complementarity before the Court, namely, the initiation of 
genuine domestic investigations and prosecutions of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, is 
for the most part yet to occur in Uganda and Sudan’.73 As Nouwen notes, though, her study is 
of two States, and does not claim to be a systematic study of all of the effects 
complementarity has throughout all possible situations.
74
 In both of the studies Nouwen 
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undertakes, there is a relatively strong central government, which is more than capable of 
identifying, weighing, and acting upon its interests. What remains to be done is to undertake 
a study of the calculations that complementarity does (or does not) inspire in other actors, 
particularly where there is limited governmental capacity. In those situations, absent action 
by non-State actors,
75
 external governance mechanisms, such as the ICC, may be the only 
drivers for compliance with IHL. 
The second issue that needs to be dealt with ‘head on’ is the counter-argument to the 
examples that have been given above, which is that, even if they are accurate, they are 
anecdotal, and can therefore not make the case for deterrence. The most sustained critique of 
deterrence based arguments has been made by Pádraig McAuliffe.
76
 McAuliffe is deeply 
skeptical of what he sees as the messianic pretensions of international criminal lawyers, 
whom he sees as being basing a naïve faith in international criminal law around human rights 
ideology, and being invested in a project of developing international criminal law.
77
 
From this position he argues that international criminal lawyers who support deterrence-
based rationales are wedded to individual sentimental stories,
78
 to say that 
[t]hese anecdotes may add something significant to our understanding of the 
restraining impact of international criminal law. Even if in-depth, small scale studies 
do not have universal applicability, they may impact beneficially on policy-making as 
‘plausibility probes’ suggesting that a generated hypothesis should be tested in a 
wider selection of countries…However, deterrence-based advocacy is less modest. It 
instead relies on these anecdotes to establish the overall credibility of deterrence. In 
doing so, it betrays the main shortcoming of single case analyses, namely that 
inferences drawn from them may not be applicable beyond the context in which the 
research takes place.
79
 
This is a strongly made (and worded) argument, but there are considerable grounds for 
skepticism about the skepticism. The first is that it relies on a rather monolithic view of 
international criminal lawyers. It may be true that some international criminal lawyers may 
argue in the manner that McAuliffe suggests (or that they can be caricatured as such) but 
international criminal lawyers, including those with sympathy for deterrence as a rationale 
belong to a broader proverbial church.
80
 It is notable that McAuliffe, for example does not 
provide a reference for his assertion, and only later mentions one speech by the President of 
the ICC that supports it. This is therefore something of a straw-man argument, and indeed he 
also cites Theodor Meron as accepting that the evidence is ‘anecdotal and uncertain.’81 Most 
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international criminal lawyers would not go further. What perhaps can be said is that the 
number of pieces of anecdotal evidence are stacking up, and although they do not make a 
comprehensive case, the more evidence there is, the stronger the case becomes that there can 
be a contribution to deterrence from international criminal prosecutions. It is true that there 
are huge epistemological problems with determining what causes (and therefore what may 
prevent) international crimes, as the decisions to undertake such conduct depends on many 
factors,
82
 but this cuts both ways. Furthermore, it is almost certainly the case that a 
comprehensive study of all conflicts on this basis would simply be impossible, therefore the 
best is the enemy of the good here. 
A more philosophical response is given by Jakob von Holderstein Holtermann, who argues 
that whatever the problems of determining the extent to which punishment deters crime, such 
difficulties do not answer the question of whether or not criminal courts ought to be set up. 
This is because such difficulties do not make the case against deterrence arguments, they 
simply show the fact that we have to work on incomplete information, and therefore it 
becomes a question of what is more plausible. On different, but related grounds, he asserts 
that the burden of proof is on those who deny the deterrent value of prosecution to show that 
this is the case.
83
 His reason for doing so is that ‘human beings are by and large 
instrumentally rational actors’, and thus intuitively, the fear of prosecution ought to have an 
effect on behavior.
84
 He has a point. 
2.2. Conditions for deterrence 
Whatever level of empirical evidence is required, few, if any, would argue that deterrence can 
be even contributed to without certain conditions being fulfilled. Méndez, for example, has 
argued that there are, in essence, two major criteria for deterrence, these are certainty of 
application of the law, and the second, that ‘it has to follow its own rules, especially to allow 
the operation of the law without interference and not subject to political considerations…If 
courts and prosecutors are contemplated as levers to force the parties to negotiate, their 
independence and impartiality will be undermined because they will be turned on and off as 
political circumstances dictate.’85 To this we ought to add the perceived legitimacy of the 
process, which feeds into the perception of the political or otherwise nature of the relevant 
Court or Tribunal.
86
 
Any asserted deterrent function of prosecutions of course, requires a credible threat of 
prosecution of such leaders. Turning to the context at hand (Africa); after decades of non-
prosecution, many African leaders assumed that victory or exile would serve to ensure their 
freedom and (often) continued wealth and influence. However, for many, the indictment, and 
eventual capture and prosecution of Charles Taylor was a considerable shock. An African 
leader, who had negotiated, and taken up, exile in Nigeria, and who had the support of well-
known African figures such as Colonel Gadaffi and Omar al-Bashir, found himself no longer 
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welcome in his new home, and was arrested and sent for trial.
87
 In part, this was a political as 
much as a legal event, but the symbolic value of the arrest was huge.
88
 Were al-Bashir to end 
up before the ICC, the message would become clearer, and given the horror with which most 
seem to view the possibility of being tried before an international criminal court, the 
possibility of specific deterrence ought not be discounted. Hence, although, prior to the 
1990s, there was little chance of anyone being prosecuted for international crimes the tide is 
slowly turning against that position. 
The real issue now is one that mixes the two criteria Méndez suggests. That is the prospect of 
selective enforcement. This is well-trodden ground, so it is not the intention of this piece to 
engage in detailed reflections on the selective aspects of international criminal law 
throughout its history. That has been done elsewhere.
89
 What is important is the extent to 
which it characterizes modern practice, in particular in relations to Africa, and the extent to 
which it undermines the factors militating in favor of compliance.  
Deterrence, insofar as it relies on the likelihood of prosecution, will, of necessity, be 
undermined if a person thinks that the law will not be enforced against them. Therefore the 
extent to which they may maintain leverage, and ensure that international criminal law will 
only be applied to others is likely to be part of the rational calculation that may be entered 
into when deciding whether or not to commit international crimes. For example, Yoweri 
Museveni had little to fear when he referred the situation in northern Uganda to the ICC to 
the extent to which he did not think the Prosecutor of the ICC would be interested in the 
UPDF, as, in time, it proved he was not. The same applies for other ‘self-referrals’ to the 
ICC, where it has proved to be the case that the ICC Prosecutor has focused his work on the 
conduct of rebels rather than those who referred the situation (i.e. the government). There are 
limited exceptions to this, primarily in the context of the post-election violence in Kenya, 
where after considerable African Union and other support for the possibility of ICC activity, 
the Prosecutor decided to proceed against all sides in the conflict on the basis of his proprio 
motu powers. That said, the (for the most part) refusal of the Prosecutor to aggressively 
pursue either governmental figures in Africa (outside the context of Security Council 
referrals) or any actors outside of Africa may give rise to a feeling that such people are safe 
from the ICC, and this is something that a rational actor would take into account. Again, 
without a credible threat of prosecution, the deterrent effect is limited. Given the perception 
in Africa, justified or not, that the ICC is a political organ that is targeting certain African 
actors on political grounds,
90
 rather than undertaking its processes on legal ones, responses, 
and calculations with respect to it (including whether to commit international crimes) will be 
at the political level. 
 
This is a significant dilemma. The first Prosecutor of the ICC was fond of stating that he was 
above politics, and will only follow the law in deciding what to do. For example, in 
Nuremberg in 2007 he said that ‘As the Prosecutor of the ICC, I have been given a clear 
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judicial mandate. I must apply the law without regard to political considerations.’91 Few are 
convinced of this.
92
 A more realistic view has been given by David Crane, the ex-prosecutor 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
International criminal law is about politics. It is a naïve Chief prosecutor who plans 
for and executes his prosecution plans (if he or she has one) without keeping in mind 
the bright red thread of politics that permeates the entire existence of a tribunal of 
court. Conceived due to a political event and a creature of political compromise, 
politics is in the DNA of all of the justice mechanisms that make up the modern era of 
international criminal justice.
93
 
 
The story he tells, of how he had to ensure the support, both logistical, and military, to ensure 
the enforcement of the warrants of arrest from the US and UK, and at times behind the back 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General is an interesting one.
 94
 But it paints, in 
spite of its upbeat tone, and image of practicality it adopts, a picture of international criminal 
justice that is likely to remain heavily influenced by politics, and where politics enters, 
selective enforcement is soon to follow. Nor is his account unique in this regard.
95
 As such, 
the role of international criminal prosecutions will remain, for the foreseeable future, one 
which is circumscribed with politics. Against this background, the way forward is to 
maximize the compliance effect of international criminal law as far as possible within the 
political boundaries in which it functions.  
 
Many of the assumptions about deterrence are binary. Either international criminal law deters 
international crimes or it does not. This is, to say the least, unuanced. The better position to 
adopt is that prosecutions of violations of international criminal law are relevant to, and can 
contribute to, deterrence of international crimes. It is not necessary to assert that international 
criminal law, on its own, can deter international crimes. As many of the critics of deterrence 
in international criminal law have said, other aspects, such as sanctions, and military 
intervention may play a larger role in preventing international crimes than international 
criminal law.
96
 But this is not the point. The more important question is whether or not the 
possibility of prosecution can contribute to the deterrence of international crimes rather than 
whether it can do so on its own. This means that international criminal lawyers need to 
renounce the hubris of perfect deterrence. A realistic approach is required that accepts that 
international criminal justice is an example of the art of the possible, and therefore perfect 
deterrence, or a perfect separation between law and politics, simply cannot be achieved. 
 
3. Denunciation/education 
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 The other argument in favour of international criminal prosecutions contributing to 
compliance with IHL is that they can contribute to changing people´s minds about what is 
acceptable, and the creation of a culture of accountability, and thus compliance. This role is 
strongly linked to the Denunciatory/educative (or ‘expressive’) effect of international 
criminal prosecutions. Such justifications of punishment rely on the idea that one of the 
purposes of punishment is to denounce the behavior, and communicate to the offender, and 
society at large, that such conduct is wrongful, this vindicating, and publicizing, the relevant 
norm.
97
 As can be seen, this also has specific and general aspects, as Lucia Zedner has 
explained, the communicative effect of prosecution is ‘an opportunity for communicating 
with the offender, the victim and wider society the nature of the wrong done’.98 The ICTY 
has asserted that international criminal law has this function,
99
 and there is much to be said 
for the idea that international criminal law has, as a major function, if nothing else, the 
propagation of the norms that are encapsulated in its strictures. Kathryn Sikkink has also 
argued that much conduct which is law-compliant comes not simply from fear of punishment, 
but from acculturation to the relevant norms.
100
 This is similar to Payam Akhavan´s view 
that: 
From the criminal justice process emanates a flow of moral propaganda such that 
punishment of the individual offender is transformed into a means of expressing 
social disapproval. In addition to the fear and conscious moral influence of 
prosecution, it is also possible to create “unconscious inhibitions against crime and 
perhaps establish a condition of habitual lawfulness” such that illegal actions will not 
present themselves consciously as real alternatives to conformity.
101
 
It may be the case that the specific communicative role in international criminal law may be 
limited, owing to the fact that many of those prosecuted by international criminal tribunals 
denounce their legitimacy. In practice it might be questioned whether specific 
communication will ever be a major aspect of international trials. Perhaps, therefore general 
communication may be a better way to go. 
In some ways, though a more basic claim can be made. As Nicholas Lamp has observed, 
although ignorance of the law is no defense, it is clearly the case that the parties compliance 
with the law can be helped by knowing what the relevant law is.
102
 He argues that in the new 
wars this is very difficult. Some, such as William Schabas, argue that the norms of 
international criminal law represent behavior that is universally condemned as apodictically 
mala in se.
103
 This is not always the case, so it is useful to engage in a case-study of a war 
crime that has only recently been clearly recognized as such, and prosecuted at the 
international level. This is the war crime of child soldiering.  
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Although there were a number of universal and regional (African) treaties that dealt with the 
prohibition of recruitment and use of child soldiers, such conduct was a frequent and 
widespread characteristic of African conflicts, and seen by many as culturally appropriate, or 
at least not wrong, on the basis that in Africa, or at least parts of it, it was a legitimate cultural 
practice and that the ability to act as a warrior was, for males, an indicium of the transition 
from childhood to adulthood.
104
 The first time that child soldiering was subject to express 
criminalization, though, was in the Rome Statute in 1998. Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) covers 
‘[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed 
forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities´. In international armed conflicts, 
more importantly for our purposes, owing to the fact that the majority of African conflicts are 
non-international, Article 8(2)(e)(vii) criminalises analogous conduct in non-international 
armed conflicts (without the limitation ‘into national armed forces´. 
This was included in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Statute in Article 3(c), 
however, as that provision was initially drafted by the Secretary-General,  as suggested by the 
Secretary-General is more narrowly formulated than Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute to 
cases involving abduction and forced recruitment. Owing to his concern that the provision was 
not customary as far back as 1996 (the starting point of the jurisdiction of the Special Court) the 
Secretary-General sought to cast it as a specific application of Common Article 3. The Security 
Council disagreed strongly with the Secretary-General on this point, and requested that the 
Secretary-General “modify...[Article 4(c)]...so as to conform it to the statement of the law 
existing in 1996 and as currently accepted by the international community”.105 The Security 
Council’s suggested modification was to language tracing that in the Rome Statute, and appears 
to represent a claim that Article 8(2)(e)(vii) is not only customary now, but was also customary 
law in 1996.  
This question was bitterly contested in the SCSL in the Norman decision. In this case the 
defense challenged the legality of the provision, on the basis that customary international law 
did not recognize such an offence in 1996. The majority in that case determined, on, it must be 
said, not a great deal of evidence that it did.
106
 The controversial then-president of the Tribunal, 
Geoffrey Robertson disagreed, at least until the coming into being of the Rome Statute, and 
also raised a further point, relating to the drafting of the Statute, and the question of whether a 
defendant could have known whether or not international law criminalized the use of child 
soldiers. 
 
It might be thought odd that the state of international law in respect of child soldiers 
was doubtful to the UN Secretary-General in 2000 but was very clear to the President 
of the Security Council only two months later. If it was not clear to the Secretary-
General and his legal advisers that international law had criminalised the enlistment 
of child soldiers, could it really have been clear to Chief Hinga Norman, or any other 
defendant at that time in embattled Sierra Leone?
107
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This is an interesting point, there are genuine questions about the extent to which the relevant 
actors were aware of the (existing or incipient) international prohibitions at this time. 
Although the enlistment and use of child soldiers is something of a NGO nostrum, there are 
genuine questions that have begun to be raised about whether the focus on prosecution of the 
use of child soldiers represents a rather Western approach to matters, in particular the cultural 
specificity of the underlying notions relating to the prohibition.
108
 In addition some have 
questioned whether or not the large scale crimes such as murders and rapes that have been 
alleged against the first ICC convict, Thomas Lubanga, who it is said did not know that the 
use of child soldiers was a crime,
109
 ought to have been prosecuted for as well.  
 
That said, the prosecutions seemed to have had a considerable effect on African actors, both 
in terms of the knowledge of the prohibition, and their concern with living up to it for fear of 
appearing before the ICC. Again, some of the evidence here is anecdotal, in that those on the 
ground are not only being engaged by, e.g. the UN officers in relation to child soldiers, but 
also that they are raising the matter without prompting.
110
 Also there is some evidence that 
relevant African actors, upon hearing about the prosecution of Thomas Lubanga for using 
child soldiers has led to actors bringing children to international officials and asking for them 
to be demobilized.
111
  The importance of the ICC’s focus on Child soldiers was attested to by 
Radhika Coomaswarmy, the UN Special Representative on Child soldiers, who testified 
before the ICC in the Lubanga case as follows:  
 
let me state how important the work of the ICC is to every one of us who works in the 
field.  The willingness on the part of the Court to prosecute these cases has sent many 
armed groups to us - the United Nations - willing to negotiate action plans for the 
release of children; most recently yesterday in Nepal where the release of 3,000 
children is about to begin today.  We found your work to be so important…112 
 
There is also some, admittedly ambiguous, evidence that the use of such soldiers is going 
down.
113
 If nothing else, the fact that there are now a not insignificant number of children in 
Northern Uganda and South Sudan who are called ‘Okambo’ at least implies that the 
prosecution of the use of child soldiers has had a cultural impact.
114
  
 
Even so, perhaps the best evidence on point is in relation to the recent Libya conflict. The 
guidelines issued by the National Transitional Council (NTC) for their fighters included, the 
demand that forces ‘DO NOT allow persons who are less than 18 years of age to fight, even 
if they have volunteered to do so.’  It is interesting to note that this did not come from the 
suggestion of an NGO from far away from the conflict, but the NTC itself. As Iain Scobbie, 
who helped draft the guidance explains:  
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When I discussed a draft of the guidelines at the Irish Centre for Human Rights in 
early May, it was pointed out that we had made no mention of child soldiers. To be 
honest, this was because we were working under pressure and were focused on our 
brief of explaining standards for detention and targeting. Shortly afterwards, however, 
the NTC itself asked for advice on child soldiers and we incorporated a few basic 
points in another revision.
115
 
 
The difference between this and many conflicts in Africa even a decade ago, is highly 
notable. It might be countered that there may have been other causative factors (such as the 
desire of the NTC to maintain support in the West) but, in spite of the perhaps mixed 
motives, and the difficulties of establishing causative factors in international affairs more 
generally, this does give some hope for criminal prosecutions in the area of disseminating 
norms and providing for some level of inculcation of the norm.  
 
A skeptic might suggest that fighters on the ground do not read the statutes and judgments of 
international criminal tribunals. This is almost certainly true, but that is not the point. The 
real issue is ensuring that those who set out the codes of conduct are aware, and think highly 
(for whatever reason) of the rules, and that they disseminate them in the relevant manner. It is 
of no practical import whether those on the ground are avid fans of the Geneva Conventions 
and other applicable rules of humanitarian law, or simply have the clear guidance that the 
NTC provides, what matters is compliance, and the extent to which prosecutions have led to 
it, and there are some grounds for cautious optimism here. 
 
 
3.1. Conditions of Education. 
 
 
Like general and specific deterrence, the educative function is marred when selective 
enforcement becomes an issue. The denuinciatory/educative function is intended, at both a 
micro, and macro level, to focus on the norm, rather than the identity of the perpetrator. At 
the micro-level, it is intended that the person is condemned, and told that they have been 
condemned for what they did, not who they are. The focus of the condemnation is the 
conduct, not the identity of the perpetrator.  Selective enforcement starts to blur this message. 
At the macro level, to prosecute some of those, from one conflict, or one side in a conflict, 
and not another, would confuse the message that prosecution is meant to have in this area. 
Again, it would imply that the identity of the perpetrator is relevant to whether the conduct is 
condemned. The point of generalized education is its emphasis on the importance of the norm 
itself. It is also the case that for there to be any sort of denunciatory/educative function, the 
relevant court must be seen as legitimate, to some extent by the defendant (although this is, as 
mentioned above, not essential), and by society at large. Without this, the educative effect 
will be undermined.  Unfortunately, there are clear pieces of evidence in the practice of the 
ICC, and international criminal law more generally, that it is far from perfect on point, if the 
ICC is perceived as being wrongly exclusively focused on Africa, thus a tool of Western neo-
colonialism, people will not be receptive to the message it seeks to inculcate about the 
unacceptability of the conduct prohibited by international criminal law.
116
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4. Conclusion 
 
 
Much of what has gone before assumes that the case for international criminal law ought to 
be made on consequentialist grounds. Deterrence, as probably the strongest consequentialist 
argument for criminal prosecutions, has taken a front seat in those debates. Even if deterrence 
was out of the question, this would not mean that international criminal law was without 
justification. Even so, it is hoped that this contribution has shown that, in spite of the 
considerable obstacles to international criminal prosecutions, they may have some role to 
play in ensuring compliance with conflicts, including in Africa, and that Africa is no different 
to any other area of the world in this regard.
117
 The evidence on point may be limited, and 
anecdotal, but that does not render it completely useless. If, for example, the Lubanga 
prosecution helped to lead to the demobilization of some child soldiers in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the NTC in Libya prohibiting their use (even though that prohibition may not 
have been upheld in all circumstances) maybe this is an acceptable contribution to 
compliance with the norms against the use of child soldiers. As others have said, claims of 
deterrence: ‘Is not a claim that everybody will be deterred all the time. It is a claim that some 
will be deterred some of the time..[and it is]… a claim that it will deter a sufficient number of 
potential perpetrators to justify the costs of producing this effect.’118 
 
Even if we take the above as given, though, what is most important in this regard for our 
purposes is that in many, although emphatically not all, conflicts in Africa, those conflicts 
occur against a backdrop of limited effective governance by official authorities. As such, the 
possibility of prosecution at the international level, either by international courts, or by 
foreign domestic courts are one of the few enforcement mechanisms that can exercise an 
inhibiting effect on the behavior of the powerful. As Hannah Arendt put it: ‘If genocide is an 
actual possibility in the future, then no people on earth...can feel reasonably sure of its 
continued existence without the help and protection of international law…’.119  
 
In the absence of State-based incentive to comply with international humanitarian law it may 
fall to international law to provide the ‘back stop’ against the commission of crimes against 
international law. This function is not a new one. The point of having crimes against 
humanity in the Nuremberg Charter was that German criminal law did not fully protect (inter 
alia) the German (or stateless) Jewish, Roma, and homosexual population, hence the savings 
clause in Article 6(c) of the Charter, that applied crimes against humanity to conduct whether 
or not it was a violation of the criminal law in the locus delicti.  
 
The contribution that the threat of criminal prosecution can make to prevention of 
international crimes ought to be appraised in a manner that accepts that criminal justice has a 
role, but not necessarily a determinative one, in ensuring compliance with humanitarian law. 
In this regard, it is important to note that it ought not be the case that anyone put all their eggs 
in the ICC’s basket.120 The Rome Statute itself does not claim that the ICC can, itself, prevent 
international crimes, the optimistic preamble limits itself to the claim that the ICC can 
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‘contribute’ to the prevention of international crimes.121 As a result, we ought to approach the 
possible preventative role of international criminal law and the ICC, with humility and an 
understanding of the limits of criminal justice.
122
 Mark Osiel is correct in identifying the 
issue as, rather than focusing on whether one mechanism does nor does not prevent 
international crimes, ‘aligning incentives’ against the commission of such offences.123 Just as 
there is more than one carrot available in responses to international crimes, there are more 
than one stick available too, be they financial sanctions (targeted or otherwise), derecognition 
or non-recognition of various parties to conflicts (as happened in Libya in 2011), refusal to 
grant aid, loans, or membership of international organizations.  
 
In addition, it is important to remember the educative effect of international criminal law. 
The evidence we have, which is, again, anecdotal rather than systematic, is that the educative 
role of the ICC, in particular has been quite strong, and has had an impact on the ground. This 
needs to be borne in mind when the cost/benefit analysis is entered into (if we accept that it 
ought to be at all). It also has a bearing no aspects of institutional priority, in particular the 
extent to which outreach activities ought to be engaged with. The ICTY and ICTR have been 
criticized heavily in the past for their failings in this regard.
124
 The ICC has been more pro-
active in this regard, and such an approach seems to have paid off, at least to a reasonable 
degree. Therefore the possible role that criminal prosecution of violations of IHL should not 
be written off. Prosecutions have a role to play, and some grounds upon which they may do 
so ought not to be ceded to the skeptics without something of a fight.  
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